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Abstract 
Modern organisational structure and risk management model are characterised by a wide 
range of forces including the role of human factors which combine to create an 
unprecedented level of uncertainty and exposure to information security risk, investment and 
decision making process. Developing a risk-driven investment model for information security 
systems with consideration of subjective nature of critical human factors, is a challenging 
task. The overall success of an information security system depends on analysis of the risks 
and threats so that appropriate protection mechanism can be in place to protect them. 
However, lack of appropriate analysis of such dependencies and understanding potentially 
results in information security systems to fail or to fully achieve their that depend on them. 
Existing literature does not provide adequate guidelines for a systematic process or an 
appropriate modelling language to support such analysis. This paper fills this gap by 
introducing a process that allows information security managers to capture possible risk-
investment relationships and to reason about them. The process is supported by a modelling 
language based on a set of concepts relating to trust and control and secure tropos and 
requirements engineering. In order to demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the 
approach a descriptive example from an UK organisation is used.  
Keywords: Information Security (IS), Information Security Risk-Driven Investment Model (RIDIM), 
Risk, Social Engineering Attacks (SEAs), Security Investment (SI), Return On Investment in 
Information Security (ROISI). 
 
1. Introduction 
It is hard to accept that nowadays, organisations get along without having an astute 
information system. Information systems support organisations to achieve strategic 
competitive advantage. This is beside cost savings and decision making advantages by 
assisting for a timely implementation of projects and effective risk management with a great 
consideration of human factors. Subjective nature of human factors creates risks for 
achieving information security goals and subsequently organisational objectives. Therefore, 
human factors perform an important role in IS. The role of people has not only flagged by 
numerous academic studies but also by IS professionals and various IS regulations and 
standards. Providing a reliable and coherence information system requires a solid security 
framework. It ensures confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and auditability of 
the critical information assets. Also, it assists to achieve organisational goals and to ensure 
the continuity of business. Inadequate implementation of security causes serious impacts on 
organisations’ productivity and reputation [1] [2]. According to the “Information Security 
Breaches: Technical Report” by the UK Department for Business, Information & Skills in 
2012, large organisations faced with 93% increase in cyber-threats [3]. Even using the latest 
security techniques and protocols, most systems still face a lot of security breaches. 
Technological solutions to deal with issues arise from information security are very similar 
globally, such as anti-virus, and intrusion detection systems [4]. Numerous technical 
advancements do not always produce a more secure environment [5].  
 
This paper presents a risk-driven investment model that analyses the human factors which 
pose potential risks within the organisational context. The novel contribution of this work is 
to analyse specific critical human factors which have subjective natures in an objective and 
dynamic domain of risk, security and investment. The study developed a risk-driven security 
model for understanding of the role of human factors in security incidents, concerning risk, 
security and return of an investment on security. Social Engineering Attacks (SEA) use as 
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security incidents example because SEAs are greatly influenced by human factors [17]. The 
proposed model assists the mitigation process from an organisational perspective. It draws on 
current SEAs curves. The study proposes and validate a holistic model of investment and 
risk-driven model which supports understanding through identifying key elements and 
components of Return On Investment in Information Security (ROISI). In addition, provides 
an understanding of associated risks under the proposed Information Security Risk-Driven 
Investment Model (RIDIM). These objectives were achieved through the collection of 
quantitative and qualitative data utilising Requirements Engineering (RE) and secure tropos 
methods.  
The paper is structured in four main section. Following the introduction, section 2 presents 
business objectives and security relationship, defining risk, ROISI and SEAs concepts. It also 
reviews the critical human factors. Section 3 presents the risk-driven investment model along 
with the activities that support the process. Section 4 discusses the applicability of the 
proposed RIDIM model with a case study. Finally, we will look at the study limitation 
concluded issues and future work.   
 
2. Business objectives and Security Relationship  
2.1 Business Objectives 
Effective ISMS depends greatly on knowledge of business as much as security architecture is 
required to understand business problem. Security professionals required translating business 
requirements and goals into an ISMS solution capable of meetings those goals and 
requirements. Business domains and process are varied even in a same industry sector with 
same nature of business. For example, retail banking, investment banking and insurance in 
finance industry. Despite being in a same industry, the business concepts are divergent. 
Without understanding business requirements and objectives as well as specific industry 
trend, it is difficult to design and architecture any security systems. This leads to lack of 
insight into risks and investment related concepts and ultimately insufficient and inaccurate 
understanding and estimation of ROISI. Business domain and the IT strategy in use of 
resources, are two factors that most influenced organisations to adopt security 
countermeasures [6]. Therefore, the impact of security breaches and consequently the cost of 
breach and countermeasures are varied.  Business domain, risks and critical human factors all 
provide sources for ISMS requirements (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. ISMS Requirements Dependency  
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Organisations are controlled and run by set of policies which shaped by corporate 
governance.   
 
Information security as part of corporate governance assists organisations to achieve greater 
productivity with better cost efficiencies, as well as, legal and regulatory compliance. 
However, information security often seen as a remote activity by many organisations with a 
technical nature. Therefore, they fail to link business objectives to security goals. Some 
authors suggested a link between the business domain to the IT domain [7]. The business 
domain entails, processes, functions, and objects. Therefore, there is a clear link between 
business domain and information security. In addition, the business domain maps to the 
ISMS process and is decomposed into procedures, activities and tasks which is historically 
not be defined with business process [8]. In addition, risks and human factors from the 
business domain are mapped to the functions and objects of ISMS. The business processes 
and functions are understood through IT, which aggregates one or more functions from the 
ISMS. However, IT and consequently security have been seen as an agile project, therefore, 
they have not been grown into business domain. Based on ISMS requirements and the 
relation with business domain and risks, the identification of business domain and its 
concepts are: 
 
• Defining of business processes and their actors 
• Categorisation and valuation of assets 
• Determining security requirements: vulnerabilities and threats 
• Assessing risks  
• Identification of countermeasures and control mechanism  
 
Considering this introduction to business objectives and security relationships, we will define 
the concepts of risk, ROISI and SEA (security incidents). However, before that discussion, 
we present a review of critical human factors which we identified in our previous studies [9] 
[10].   
2.2 Critical Human Factors  
It has been reported that human errors and other factors related to people and system 
problems caused two-thirds of data breaches and security incidents in 2012 [11]. According 
to this report, this was included lack of system controls as well as human mishandling of 
confidential data. The incidents cost financial and healthcare organisations, which are 
excessively, regulated 70 percent more than other sectors. Same report also estimated that 64 
percent of security incidents have directly related to human errors. Despite widely accepted 
human factors impacts on the security incidents, the average cost of each incident is varied 
globally. In our previous studies we have identified a number of human factors, including 
direct and indirect factors that are: Errors, Awareness, Skills, Experience, Apathy, Ignorance 
and Negligence, Stress, Budget, Culture, Communication, Security Policy Enforcement, 
Incentive and Disincentive Policy and Management Support. We then prioritised critical 
human factors, Security Awareness, Communication and Support of Management. These 
factors considered for developing RIDIM model.   
 
2.3 Risk concepts 
 
Risk management principally emphasis on completing projects successfully through the 
management and control of known risks. The information security risk management as part of 
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enterprise risk management initiatives focuses on achieving security of assets and 
information systems by managing and controlling security risks. Speedy evolvement of risks 
in information security is overtaking this approach. Information security resilience requires 
acknowledgment that organisations must prepare now to deal with severe impacts from 
security incidents that are impossible to predict, detect and prevent. Organisations must 
extend risk management to include risk resilience, in order to manage, respond and mitigate 
any adverse impacts of information security incidents.  
 
Security resilience also requires that organisations have the agility to predict, detect and 
prevent security incidents by responding rapidly, efficiently and effectively to security 
incidents, as well as, the consequences of the incidents. This means understanding 
multidisciplinary units such as risks, investment and business domain, and their functions in 
organisations, for developing and evaluating control plans and settings for when security 
incidents occur. This understanding should be able to follow with effective communication 
channels with all parts of the organisation, employees, contractors who might have been 
compromised, in addition to, shareholders, regulators and any other stakeholders who might 
be penetrated. Figure 2 depicts information security risk interdependency concepts in which 
the following core risk objectives can be defined: 
 
• Identification of critical organisational systems and assets 
• Assess and assign value and importance to the identified systems and assets  
• Identification of the threats and vulnerabilities to the systems and assets  
• Determine the known risks pattern 
• Determine the existing control measures or other risk mitigating features  
• Identification of the residual risks 
• Developing risk profile and aligning it with investment in information security 
• Risk mitigation strategy 
• Determining inherent risks: value of the unmitigated risk exposure   
• Requiring regular reports of evaluation and update of risk profile 
• Documentation of risk assessment process, including the risk acceptance criteria and 
criteria for risk assessment 
 
 
Figure 2: Information Security Risk Concepts 
2.4 Return On Information Security Investment (ROISI) Concepts 
Tools and strategies are essential to organisations to be cost effective whilst information 
security professionals endeavour how to demonstrate the value and ROISI. Available tools 
and methods allow organisations to calculate and analyse the financial impact of a specific 
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security control, which cannot be used to analyse the cost-benefits of other factors, such as 
critical human factors. Information security management system is now increasingly based on 
economic principles such as cost-benefit analysis [12]. There are important variables in this 
measurement that are required to be as precise as possible. Accurate information of likelihood 
of security incidents and their impacts must be acquired in order to assist the quantification of 
ROISI. The traditional approach to the return of the investment is used in enterprises as a 
performance measure to assess the effectiveness of an investment and can be used in ROISI. 
The two important concepts used in ROISI are: Return On Investment (ROI) and Net Present 
Value (NPV). The general cost-analysis in organisations draws a picture and understanding 
of business and technical requirements of return on investment. The classical and general 
ROI calculation looks like this [12]: 
 
ROI = 
			
			
	
		
	  
 
The traditional calculation it is quite straightforward when organisations deal with clear 
amount of tangible investment, where profit is evident and apparent and revenue is acquired 
that is greater than investment. However, in information security whilst we can calculate the 
total cost, there is no revenue to be made. Information security typically averts loss rather 
than generating profit from its investment. Traditional ROI can be extended in ROISI in the 
following formula: 
 
ROISI = 
		×%		
	  
 
This calculation based on known risks and their relevant mitigation mechanism. Net Present 
Value (NPV) would be the method shown below where  is Initial Investment for security 
measure; ΔE	L# is Reduction in Expected Loss in a specific period, ΔOCC#	is Reduction in 
Opportunity Costs in a Specific Time, &# is Costs of security measure in a specific Time and 
'	()*( is the Discount Rate [13]. 
+,- =		− +	1ΔE	L# 	+ 		ΔOCC#	 − 	&#1 + '	()*(#
3
345
 
 
Organisations receive recommendations for SI based on the outcome of this model depending 
on positive or negative value. This model and the most proposals in ROISI consider a single 
security measures rather than ISMS [12]. Also, it has been noted that NPV presents a time 
value for investment [14]. Therefore, ROISI performs for the time value of investment which 
technically speaking would be inflation and cost of capital. 
 
2.4.2 Cost of incident  
 
Organisations perceive investment on services and products whilst they are financially viable 
and justified. Executive boards of management do not consent to any business case prior to 
cost-benefit analysis [14. The cost-benefit analysis can be done through conventional process 
of accounting methods such as Net Present Value (NPV) or Internal Rate of Return (IRR). 
The following sub-factors are characterised the issue of cost: 
 
• Employee costs for resolving security incidents  
• Training/Awareness Programs 
• Cost of security controls 
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• Cost of possible maintenance/developing of new software/hardware 
• Legal cost and possible fines 
• Cost of possible use of external contractors  
• Possible cost of insurance  
• Reputational cost, including the loss of customers/orders/services 
      
Organisations tend to minimise risks, which threatening information assets. Therefore, the 
classical financial approach to ROISI is not specifically relevant to measure information 
security planning. This becomes hard to determine when it comes to non-technical aspects of 
information security systems, including critical human factors and their cost implications 
such as training. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to calculate and quantify all the costs that 
are related to the potential risks and the damages resulted from security investment. In 
addition, it is really difficult to estimate the precise likelihood of the occurrences of those 
incidents due to the volatile, erratic, dynamic nature of the critical human factors and the way 
they fluctuate and inconsistent behaviour. This even harder because no reliable data available 
to substantiate such estimations. Information security, cost, return of investment all deal with 
monetary value whilst human factors are quite difficult to be framed and used with financial 
metrics. Despite this difficulty and as organisations require an estimation of financial 
consequences of information security incidents for the purpose of quantification which can be 
achieved by identifying risk concepts and modelling them by looking at the changes to the 
control settings based on the variation of risks. Therefore, this enables organisations for cost-
benefit analysis by comparison of cost and investment with consideration of variety of risks, 
more objectively. In later activity the ROISI calculation will be presented. This was a short 
overview of current ROISI calculation methods in industry with a summary of this study 
approach to consider all concepts of ROISI.  
 
2.5 Security incident concepts 
Security Incidents (SI) are regarded as a sequenc s of events that undesirably affect the 
information system and assets of an organisation.  Therefore, security incidents often include 
multiple threat events. Regardless of all the controls and protection mechanism organisations 
built into their information system and applications, they still experience security incidents. 
Information security standards such as ISO27001 expect that organisations to be prepared for 
these incidents [15]. Significant losses can be resulted by various types of damage that inflict 
from many threats. These threats are originated from the vulnerabilities of information 
processing systems. The type of breach is also important in studying ROISI because the 
impact is different. Understanding the dynamics by which threats engage with a company’s 
assets and controls allows security professional to model risks.  One of the outputs of that 
model is the ability to see how the risk varies as the control settings change.  If the company 
can estimate the cost required to turn a control setting up one or two clicks, and the model 
tells how the risk falls when a control turn up with couple of clicks, then it is straightforward 
to do a ROISI calculation for each proposed change.  The ROIS is the reduction in expected 
harm for the cost of the change. 
 
Security incidents are greatly dependent on human factors. Although impacts are varied but 
the quantification of the impacts are not clear [16]. One of the main reasons for this would be 
the nature of controls as it mentioned earlier. Security incident can be defined in details with 
the following elements: 
 
• Description of incident 
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• Description of security controls and countermeasures 
• Estimation of Losses 
 
Based on above elements, security incident response entails a number of activities. They can 
be, detection and analysis of an incident and recovery process from it. Considering the above 
definition and description, this paper used Social Engineering Attacks (SEA) as an example 
of security incident. In here we define SEA incidents. 
 
2.6 Social Engineering Attacks (SEA) 
 
Social engineering is the act of manipulating a person to take an action that may or may not 
be in the target’s best interest which include obtaining information, gaining access or getting 
the target to take a certain action [17]. Organisations may use various tools such as web 
server security to detect and minimize SEAs but they have difficulty in preventing and 
responding to human actions and behaviour in socially engineered incidences. SEAs resulted 
mainly in the exploitation of many related issues of human factors. There are specific factors, 
which were identified, in the previous study and play important roles in such attacks [10]: 
Lack of awareness and ample set of skills, inadequate communication skills, Lack of 
supervision and sufficient involvement of management. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
human factors and human social interactions can be engineered for exploitation in gaining 
access to an organisation’s assets.  
 
2.6.1 Reasons Behind Social Engineering Attacks 
 
Human factors remain essential to any SEAs because no matter how many training programs 
or control mechanisms are deployed; people are the weakest link in security [18]. SEAs can 
cause a great deal of disruption to everyday business activities and create financial, social and 
technical mayhem in which the impacts may go beyond geographical borders and 
organizational boundaries. Therefore, dealing with SEAs would be in the best interest of any 
organisation. According to the (Verizon 2014) report, human factors are the main sources of 
SEAs [19]. People can be easily socially engineered which leads to compromise of 
information systems in organisations. Even when attackers use complex and sophisticated 
technical hacking methods they would consider using people as a main tool in delivering their 
malicious software. Janczewski and Fu identified five main causes of SEAs, i.e., people, lack 
of security awareness, psychological weaknesses, technology, and defences and attack 
methods [17]. 
 
2.6.2 Social Engineering Attacks Taxonomy 
 
SEAs undermine organisations’ efforts to deal with security in an effective way. There are 
several malicious practices such as Advanced Persistent Attack that create security breaches 
in organisations [20]. Janczewski and Fu (2010) defined the SEAs with two distinct methods; 
the “Human-Based and Technology-Based” attacks [17]. However, the role of people and 
certain human factors are contributing greatly to SEAs. The attackers crack the security of an 
information system by exploitation of human weaknesses. It is a challenging task for 
organisations to deal with SEAs because they are human-oriented activities and human 
factors are difficult to deal with. Figure 3 depicts the link between human factors, SEAs, their 
objectives and consequences.  
 
Page 7 of 21 Information Management and Computer Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
8 
 
 
Figure 3: Social Engineering Attack Taxonomy 
There have been a number of works that focus on analysing SEA attacks. Janczewski & Fu 
(2010) provided a conceptual model in order to understand SEAs impacts on individuals and 
businesses and present a defensive approach to mitigate these risks [17]. The study focused 
on IT departments and a more abstract view of SEAs without considering SEAs concepts 
related to critical human factors and their relationships to the concept of SI. Greitzer et al 
(2014) looked at the insider threat that derives from SEAs [21]. The study considered some 
related human factors but concentrated mainly on unintentional insider threats whilst 
observing psychological and social characteristic of people. Karpati et al (2012) used a 
comparison study between mal-activity diagram and misuse cases and presented two 
modelling techniques [22]. There are advantages and efficiencies of each approach. Some 
other studies concentrated on specific attacks such as phishing attacks [23] or advanced 
persistent attacks [24].  
 
All the above-mentioned works contribute towards investigating SEAs security incidents.  
However, none of these works explicitly focus on critical human factors, which are one of the 
main reasons for SEAs. Therefore, it is important, analysing human factors whilst 
considering SI in so that an organisation can make the right decision relating to information 
security.      
 
3. Information Security Risks-Driven Investment Model 
 
This section presents the proposed model. The model consists of a systematic process to 
identify the business risks posed against crucial information assets, providing best way to 
eliminate and mitigate those risks. For this reason and in order to provide specifications of the 
process of development of SEAs risk-based artefact, there are certain activities required. The 
information security standards such as ISO27000 family that includes and embraces ISMS 
with ISO27001, advise for adopting risk and standards-based approach to implement an 
ISMS. In this study we use some of the guidelines provided by ISO27000 family of 
information security standards and introduce the Information Security Risk-Driven 
Investment Model (RIDIM). 
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RIDIM activities are performed that we show in Figure 4, include tasks and steps involved 
within the modelling process. Organisational analysis is the commencing activities of initial 
Secure Tropos requirements process. This will follow by the analysis of incident whilst the 
consent of all involved parties are obtained. The final phase consists of the calculation of 
ROISI. The modelling process will map of all the activities including the recommendations of 
the mitigation process. It also provides a justification for the control mechanism in this 
process based on the SI concepts. In order to to map and evaluate the concepts of the 
proposed RIDIM model the following activities are planned. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Activities for Information Security Risk-Driven Investment Model (RIDIM) 
 
Activity 1: Organisational Analysis  
 
This activity consists of the following steps that cover the ISMS policies, business process 
and human factors: 
 
• Defining Critical Human Factors 
In order to define critical human factors, we used Delphi Expert Panel Technique. The Delphi 
method is seen as a popular an established tool in the field of information security [27] [28] 
[29]. Its purpose was to develop a stable and consistent method that could be used to achieve 
consensus of a group of experts [27]. Delphi technique was incorporated in three stages:  
1. Brainstorming sessions to identify human factors 
2. Narrowing down main human factors  
3. Prioritising and ranking human factors  
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Figure 5 shows an overview of tasks, identifying and rankings of human factors.  
 
Figure 5:  An overview of the phases of Delphi expert panel 
Phase 1: Brainstorming  
In this phase, a group-brainstorming session with structured questions was conducted to 
stimulate main human factors as subjective data. A survey of 62 respondents belonging to 7 
organisations were performed. The brainstorming sessions were run in all seven organisations 
separately in which all participants agreed to set of factors in their ISMS projects 
experiences.   Table 1 provides an overview details of organisations, ISMS projects and the 
survey participants.   
Delphi Survey Organisations Info 
Organisations Outline Respondents were experts belonged to industry and 
academia 
ISMS Projects Main human and people issues related to security 
projects  
Detail on Participants  The total of the participants was 62. They were from 
different layer of the organisations, including Chief 
Information Security officers (CISO), Chief 
Information Officers (CIO), IT managers, and 
participants from academia.   
Table 1: Overview of Participants Organisations 
The participants were also asked to justify the reasoning for their selection and ranking of the 
factors. They were given two weeks for their responses. In the first phase, 34 of 62 experts 
(52%) offered their assistance, generating a list of 13 human factors for ISMS that was 
similar to the factors in this list were established in this research through multiple methods. 
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The outcome of this process was the identification of 13 human factors listed in Table 2 with 
ranking where 1-5 are very significant whilst 5-13 having various value of significance.  
Factors Ranking Human Factor Description  
1 Communication (F1) concerning exchange of 
messages and ideas between 
people inside and outside  
2 Awareness (F2) ensure that people understand 
their responsibilities  
3 Management support (F3)  management to advocate and 
deliver a clear message of ISMS 
policy to the rest of the 
organisation 
4 Budget (F4) It concerns with adequate budget 
planning 
5 Errors (F5) Can be described as a divergence 
in a system that works accurately 
6 Skills (F6) Skills facilitate the function of a 
role  
7 Experience (F7) Concerns people background 
8 Incentives/Disincentive (F8) Reward good behaviour and 
punish bad attitude 
9 Security Policy Enforcement (F9) A document in which the 
information security procedures 
and rules are outlined 
10 Culture (F10) consists of values, beliefs, 
practices, attitudes, behaviour, 
reputation, and ethics  
11 Stress (F11) Individuals’ stress in 
corporations can be caused by 
heavy workloads and tight 
project deadlines. 
12 Apathy (F12) unwillingness of employees and 
in their attitude toward the goals 
and objectives  
13 Ignorance and Negligence (F13) not pay enough attention to 
security policy 
Table 2: Ranking of Human Factors by Importance 
Phase 2: Narrowing down main human factors 
Phase two of the survey study concluded of 18 open questions and 24 closed questions in the 
mode of questionnaire were presented to the participants. The feedback received from the 
brainstorming sessions were formed the questions and questionnaire to ensure the refinement 
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of the human factors. In order to reduce any possible bias by missing factors, the participants 
were given an opportunity to offer feedback on the factor they wished to share.  
Phase 3: Ranking main human factors 
The third phase of the process consists of sending questionnaires to the entire group that 
included 13 main human factors identified in the previous two phases and the average 
importance and rating from the phase 2. This was included a reasoning of the selections. 
Figure 7 depicts the number of respondents at this stage and based on the percentage. Figure 
6 shows the three main factors with their sub-factors.  
     
Figure 6: Three top Ranking of Human Factors with Sub-factors 
 
• Identification and classification of critical organisational systems and assets 
 
Each asset needs to be identified such as servers, applications and databases. This reference 
provides the foundation for managing and measuring vulnerabilities. This is important for 
updating the status of assets and system as often as required. In addition, assets and various 
systems to be grouped and classified from low, medium priority to the most critical assets 
that are vital to the organisation operations. The classification depends on the nature of 
business domain. For example, while web servers that support order process, could be the 
most critical devices for an Internet merchant, whilst for a manufacturer the systems that 
support the supply chain, could be a vital asset. The objective is to classify those assets and 
systems that are essential to organisational operations and success and clarifying business 
process.  
 
• Identification of the threats and vulnerabilities to the systems and assets  
 
A highly accurate, comprehensive, and up-to-date approach is required to identify the latest 
vulnerabilities and misconfigurations based on timely information on the basis of security 
policies. A suitable defence mechanism requires for the detection of vulnerabilities. This 
ensures that the vulnerabilities which pose high risks are dealt with. It is essential to correlate 
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vulnerability criticality with the business value of vulnerability systems and assets. So, 
vulnerability assessments should examine infrastructure against the most accurate, up-to-date 
threats. The classification and categorisation of  vulnerabilities enable the formation of 
detailed metrics for different  types of vulnerabilities that are relevant for measuring security 
awareness, program effectiveness and adherence to security policies.  
 
• Identifying risk mitigation strategy, risk profile, inherent and unmitigated risks  
 
Organisations goals and objectives are vital to consider when adapting a risk mitigation 
strategy, otherwise the framework may not receive investment it requires. In addition, priority 
should be assumed to the threats and vulnerabilities that have the potential to cause 
significant harm then it may not be practical to deal with all identified and inherent risks. 
Risk mitigation strategy must be aligning with the financial objective of an organisation 
therefore, it is important to consider the cost of implementing controls and also the potential 
costs of not doing so. The risk exposure ratings can be used to establish recommended 
protection controls which finally direct to formation of the risk mitigation strategy. Risk 
management strategies also define security incident response when a security incident such as 
a data breach occurs.  
 
Activity 2: Incident Analysis  
 
This activity consists of the description of incidents, existing control measure and estimation 
of losses: 
 
• Description of incidents 
 
Once the organisational entities are identified and analysed by the previous activity, this 
activity deals and analyses the incident that instigated by the critical human factors. When an 
incident happens, it is central to know what to do, how to gather proof that meets legal 
criterions, and how to deal with the consequent regulatory, financially and reputation issues. 
However, it is imperative that incidents to be reported promptly to allow the issue to be 
analysed and addressed in order to reduce the occurring risks. The main goal of the incident 
analysis process is assisting to remediate any loss that may have occurred to organisations 
and minimise the damage sustained by similar incidents in the future. 
 
• Determine the existing control measures and residual risks 
 
Identifying and determining current control measures for each of the identified risks helps to 
identify the missing controls. They require a clear documentation in which the validation of 
their effectiveness and performance are confirmed. The effectiveness of controls can be used 
to re-assess and prioritise the risks in terms of their likely impact on the capacity of the 
system. High priority risks may require control mechanism’s alteration or upgrade to achieve 
security goals. This applies to the residual risks too. Residual risks are the remaining risks to 
the organisations’ assets after control measures are applied. However, organisations should 
consider a mitigation process for them.  
 
• Estimation of losses 
 
The loss is associated with incidents’ transactions such as assets used in business or lawsuit 
settlements but cost affiliates with the expenses to provide security control measures. The 
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information assets’ cost comprises tangible and intangible assets [25]. Part of the 
quantification of the ROISI relies on the estimation of the losses incurred in the case of SEAs 
when a system is exploited. Considering the severity and the possible of losses the main costs 
of an incident can be defined as:   
 
• Increased insurance premium  
• Administrative expenses (Extra Training, Internal cost-auditing) 
• Time (availability of data and system) 
• Hardware and Software cost (External cost) 
• Implementation cost (customisation, consultation, training, testing and 
communication) 
 
The incident profile will be completed when the control mechanisms are identified and and to 
be categorised against the valuation criteria and be mapped to the losses and costs. The 
existing control measures.  
 
The above mechanisms can be given valuation as Effective, Ineffective, Adequate or 
Inadequate. The introduction of new control mechanism can be matched by above ranking. 
 
Activity 3: Return on Information Security Investment (ROISI) 
 
The final activity calculates the return of any SI and contributes for the enhancement of the 
existing ISMS practice. Therefore, we need to justify whether there is a necessity of more SI 
considering the occurred incident/s. The justification for new investment will follow after the 
calculation of the return on investment.  
 
• Calculation of ROISI  
 
The final activity calculates the return of any security investment and contributes for the 
enhancement of the existing ISMS practice. Therefore, we need to justify whether there is a 
necessity of more SI, considering the occurred incident/s. In order to quantify the cost and 
benefit of security measures. The expenditure which play important role in the concept of 
ROISI. In risk management field this is called Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) that is the cost 
of the single loss. In which risk exposure can be calculated:  
Risk Exposure = ALE = SLE * ARO  
where ALE is Annual Loss Expectancy and ARO is, Annual Rate of Occurrence.  
 
The SLE provides a quantitative evaluation, using the estimation of likelihood that can be 
used for the calculation of Annualised Lost Expectancy (ALE). Vulnerabilities would be 
flaws in information process that expose a system to compromise and threats are the 
circumstance in which an actor adversely impact information assets through unauthorised 
access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service [26]. ALE, 
which also can be considered as the annual cost of risk, is the multiplication of SLE and 
likelihood of threats. After implementation of any security measure, an assessment should run 
to evaluate the frequency of any potential incident because likelihood of threat will increase 
or decrease depending on the nature of threat and its security measure. For example, the 
frequency of natural disaster stays same but if organisations deploy new and more effective 
anti-virus software the likelihood of a successful malicious code attack will decrease. Lastly, 
the estimation of cost of security measures should be considered as accurately as possible, 
considering following factors:  
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1. The cost of acquiring of security measure 
2. The cost of maintenance  
3. The cost of people (fulfilling critical human factors)   
4. The cost of value after commissioning the measurement  
 
Considering all factors and inputs ROISI can be positive or negative. In order the ROISI be 
positive is that the reduction of risk must be much greater than total investment and cost of 
security measures. This also can be seen in ALE where the annual cost of security measures 
is less than ALE. Previous studies have developed different methods using various concepts 
which it was explained earlier.  
 
Study aims to solve the described trade-off between the expected attacks losses EA(L), and the 
costs of the economical capital CE(C), on the one hand and the investments in information 
security controls IS(C) and the investment in insurance I(I) on the other hand. Thereby, the 
capital to be invested in information security control mechanisms will be optimised. Based on 
this, the total negative liquidity can be shown as: 
 
NL(T) =EA(L) + CE(C) + IS(C) + I(I) 
 
The above concepts should be expanded to assume more details of the involved costs and 
losses in order ROISI to be accurate. Therefore, in order to calculate the return of the 
investment on information security the followings must be considered in three different 
stages; stage one would be the calculation of the cost of single expected attack in an incident 
and the stage two would be to calculate the risk exposure factor and risk reduction after 
security control measures and insurance are considered with the assumption that security 
controls and investment in insurance policy reduce the loss. The third stage would be 
calculation of ROISI in absolute quantity where the ROISI calculated based on annual cost of 
protection, insurance and other costs.    
 
we also need to consider the preliminary expected cost from the following parameters:  
 
• External Services Cost ES(C)  
• Purchasing Cost P(C) 
• Employee Cost E(C) 
• Administrative Cost A(C)  
• Legal Costs L(C) 
• Other Costs O(C) 
 
Therefore, the total expected cost of an attack TEC(T) would be: 
 
TEC(T) = ES(C) + P(C) + E(C) + A(C) + L(C) + O(C) 
 
It is also the loss of the revenue from both existing (L1) and potential customers (L2) in which 
the Total Revenue Loss RL(T) can be calculated as follow: 
 
RL(T) = L1 + L2 
 
Now we can look at the following parameters we mentioned earlier: 
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• Single Expected Attack Loss SEA(L) 
• Total Expected Cost of an Attack TEC(T) 
• Insurance Claim IC(I) 
• Revenue Loss from existing/potential clients RL(T) 
• Average Margin AM(A) 
 
SEA(L)= TEC(T) – IC(I) + (RL(T)) * AM(A) 
 
Whilst the single expected attack loss has been calculated then we would be able to calculate 
the annual expected attack loss based on the likelihood (L) of the SEA occurs. This can be 
done by the following formula:  
 
AEA(L) = SEA(L) * L 
 
Now we have defined the process of the calculation of ROISI, we can see how this can be 
applied to the case study.  
 
• Justification of the Investment 
 
Quantifying costs and benefits associated with information security in organisations very 
often have difficulty to be addressed in budget proposals. Senior management generally 
perceive information security as measures of disaster recovery rather than as a mechanism for 
lowering risk and for this reason, justification of the investment in information security is a 
problematic issue [30]. Therefore, justification seems not only necessary but quite hard to 
achieve and it relies heavily on the figures.   
 
Case Study 
 
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach, the paper used a scenario. The 
following description is a real and successful SEA incident that happened in a financial 
institution within the UK and it was a very well targeted phishing attack.  
 
Scenario  
 
An employee received an email from one of the managers’ referencing an invoice hosted on a 
cloud file sharing service. A few minutes later, the same employee received a phone call from 
another manager within the organization, instructing her to examine and process the invoice. 
However, the invoice was a fake and the manager who called the employee was an attacker. 
The apparent invoice was in fact a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that was designed to contact 
and command-and-control (C&C) the server. By using the RAT, the attacker took control of 
the employee’s computer instantly. The attacker managed to breach a part of the server as the 
multi-layered encrypted server prevented him from getting access to all the servers. This 
attacker used a socially engineered attack for financial gain. Before the attack was stopped 
they succeeded in getting a financial incentive in the region of £50,000.00.  
 
Activity 1: Organisational Analysis  
 
• Defining Critical Human Factors 
Considering three identified critical human factors, the case study demonstrates the 
applicability of them. It is clear that lack of security awareness contributed to a successful 
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planned SEA. The absent of adequate authentication process in regards to communication has 
also assisted the attacker to establish a false communication channel. Finally, if senior 
management had adequate skills and awareness then it was able to support the adequate and 
appropriate control measures in place.    
 
• Identification and classification of critical organisational systems and assets 
 
The first and most critical asset which compromised was part of the server of this company. 
Financial information were the other important assets which compromised. Both 
compromised assets can be categorised as high value asset.   
 
• Identification of the threats and vulnerabilities to the systems and assets  
 
The main threat to in this case study was the installation of a Malware which assists the 
attacker to get access to the server. The user’s carelessness due to lack of adequate training 
was a vulnerability to the server which exploited. This created a potential risk of loss as the 
result of the threat exploiting the vulnerability. This clearly shows the lack of proper firewall 
and software security protection. 
 
• Identifying risk mitigation strategy, risk profile, inherent and unmitigated risks  
 
Studying the nature of the incident this company should define an adequate risk mitigation 
strategy whilst considering the cost of implementing controls and also the potential costs of 
not doing so. In addition, the company requires to prioritise, evaluate, and implement 
appropriate risk-reducing activities to address the specific risk it faces with the degree 
exposure of this incident.  
 
Activity 2: Incident analysis  
 
• Description of incidents 
 
The incident rooted mainly on the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the server but factors as 
we described in the Activity 1 originated from critical human factors. The risks concerning to 
be exposed have directly impacted the company. The nature of the incident was a SEA in 
which a malware called (RAT) that was designed to contact and command-and-control 
(C&C) the server. In short, human factors and inadequately of security detection and 
prevention system contributed to the incident.  
 
• Determine the existing control measures and residual risks 
 
Existing control measures covers security awareness training, authentication, firewall and 
encryption. However, the training manuals require an update, encryption mechanism must be 
reviewed, authentication process should be established in all sort of communication and 
firewall to be updated. All of these can address the vulnerabilities and residual risks.   
 
• Estimation of losses 
 
The estimation of the losses in regards to all variables are required, otherwise the calculation 
of the return on investment can not be justified. The company estimated all related cost of the 
incident and provided them which we will be using them in the next activity for the 
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calculation of ROISI. Comparing the estimation losses and the existing control measures 
shows the inadequately and ineffectively of current controls as the incident generated losses 
and consequently some additional costs. Given the figures for losses are provided in the next 
activity.  
 
 
 
Activity 3: Calculation of ROISI  
 
• Return on Information Security Investment (ROISI) 
 
For the purpose of this study, the paper introduced the preliminary expected cost to cover the 
loss arising from incidents from the following parameters: External Services Cost ES(C), 
Purchasing Cost-P(C), Employee Cost-E(C), Administrative Cost-A(C), Legal Costs-L(C) and 
Other Cost-O(C). Therefore, the total expected cost of new and updating control mechanism 
would be:  
 
TEC(T) = ES(C) + P(C) + E(C) + A(C) + L(C) + O(C) 
TEC(T) = 10K+5K+2K+0+1K= £18,000.00 
 
The next step is to calculate the Total Revenue Loss RL(T) that would be from both existing 
(L1) and potential customers (L2). The estimation for this company based on the its business 
and revenue are given as: 
 
RL(T) = L1 + L2 
RL(T) = 50k + 0 = 50K 
 
Now we can look at the following parameters we mentioned earlier: 
 
• Single Expected Attack Loss SEA(L) 
• Total Expected Cost of an Attack TEC(T) 
• Insurance Claim IC(I) 
• Revenue Loss from existing/potential clients RL(T) 
• Average Margin AM(A) 
 
SEA(L)= ((TEC(T) – IC(I)) + (RL(T))) * AM(A) 
SEA(L) = ((23K – 5K) + (50K) * 15% 
SEA(L) = £30500.00 
 
This would be total Single Expected Attack Loss SEA(L) considering the risk exposure just 
indicated at probability of the incident happens only “once a year” and by taking into 
consideration of the threats, vulnerabilities and existing control mechanism. Now if we apply 
a training program every three months which will cost £2k internally and £2k externally, and 
we consider an 80% reduction in the security incidents in this company with 15 employees 
and average cost of £22k for each employee, then the annual cost of new control protection 
will be £5320.00.  
 
The total New Single Expected Attack Loss NSEA(L1) after new control mechanism taking 
into consideration by: 
 
NSEA(L1) = SEA(L) * (100- % reduction of SEA(L)) = £6100.00 
 
Page 18 of 21Information Management and Computer Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
19 
 
Then the Annual Lost Expectancy based on one-year risk exposure would be:  
 
ALE = NSEA(L1) * Frequency (annually) = £24,400.00  
 
Therefore, the Risk Reduction, R(r) can be calculated with:  
 
ALE = SEA(L) – NSEA(L1) = 6100.00  
 
Eventually, if the ROISI is positive this means the investment has been returned with 
justification and if it is negative then investment can not be justified.  
 
ROISI = R(r) – Annual cost of protection (£5320.00) = £780.00  
ROISI = R(r) / (£5320.00) * 100% = 14.66%  
 
 
• Justification of the Investment 
 
The new investment is justified and it can be presented to the executive board for action.  
 
Discussion 
 
Applying the RIDIM model in a real case study shows the model can be applied and used in 
other incidents and more importantly to the incidents which critical human factors are a grave 
concern of organisations. The importance of providing a financial justification is clearly 
highlighted and provided for seeking investment in information security.    
 
4. Study Limitation 
 
The model presented by us in this paper, overcomes some of the limitations in respect to 
reasoning critical human factors for the economy of the scale. However, this study also has 
its own limitations. One of the major limitations of this model is that it supports incident 
based investment, only. This creates some sort of difficulties to presented to the executive 
board. Secondly, due to the nature of human factors, quantification does not exactly reflect 
the monetary value of the factors.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper introduces a risk-driven investment model in information security that enables 
organisations to analyse the risks and return of the investment in security controls to deal 
with security incidents. The process makes use of secure tropos, requirements engineering 
and risk management concepts. Using security, risk, business and SEA concepts allows us to 
model and reason the role of critical human factors in quantification method in regards to risk 
and investment. Therefore, risks, business domain, security incidents and investment 
concepts in an organisational perspective are not left unexamined by using our model. The 
proposed process leads to define a clear relationship between risks, incidents and investment 
and allows organisations to calculate them based on their own figures. Nevertheless, this 
model does not guarantee that organisations will fully able to calculate the return of their 
investment in the security controls. This is because most of incidents are related to critical 
human factors which makes it hard for organisations to put a figure against them. However, 
RIDIM supports the organisations in achieving a numerical quantity of all relevant costs to 
the incidents. In addition, as future work, we intend to propose methods that will further 
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support organisations for validating the control mechanism even more accurately. In addition, 
to expand our understanding of critical human factors. 
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